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This paper analyses two-player nonzero-sum games of optimal stopping
on a class of linear regular diffusions with not nonsingular boundary be-
haviour [in the sense of Itô and McKean (Diffusion Processes and Their Sam-
ple Paths (1974) Springer, page 108)]. We provide sufficient conditions under
which Nash equilibria are realised by each player stopping the diffusion at
one of the two boundary points of an interval. The boundaries of this interval
solve a system of algebraic equations. We also provide conditions sufficient
for the uniqueness of the equilibrium in this class.
1. Introduction. Given a one-dimensional regular diffusion X = (Xt)t≥0 on
an interval I ⊆ R, we consider a two-player Dynkin game [15] in which player
i ∈ {1,2} chooses a stopping time τi in order to minimise the payoff Ji (τ1, τ2;x),
where
J1(τ1, τ2;x) := Ex[e−rτ1G1(Xτ1)1{τ1<τ2} + e−rτ2L1(Xτ2)1{τ2≤τ1}],(1.1)
J2(τ1, τ2;x) := Ex[e−rτ2G2(Xτ2)1{τ2≤τ1} + e−rτ1L2(Xτ1)1{τ1<τ2}],(1.2)
taking into account the stopping time chosen by player j := 3− i [here Ex denotes
the expected value under the measure Px(·) = P(·|X0 = x)]. In particular, we aim
to provide sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria
of the following threshold type:
τ ∗1 =τ1
(
x∗1
)
, τ ∗2 = τ2
(
x∗2
)
for some x∗1 < x∗2 ,(1.3)
where, for x, z ∈ I , we define Px -a.s. the stopping times
τ1(z) := inf{t > 0 : Xt ≤ z} and(1.4)
τ2(z) := inf{t > 0 : Xt ≥ z}.
For i = 1,2, we refer to Ji(τ ∗1 , τ ∗2 ;x) as an equilibrium payoff. Our interest in such
equilibria is guided by the seminal paper [6], where equilibrium stopping times are
the hitting times of sets defined by free boundaries.
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In our game, the stopping cost for player i is equal to either Gi(Xτi ) or Li(Xτj )
(continuously discounted at the rate r > 0), depending on who stops first. While
the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria are questions of fundamental in-
terest, it is also valuable to investigate the structure of equilibria under general
dynamics for X, a topic which has so far received relatively little rigorous mathe-
matical treatment. In particular, having established the existence of an equilibrium
structure such as (1.3) we may derive algebraic characterisations of the thresholds
[i.e., x∗1 and x∗2 in (1.3)] enabling straightforward numerical evaluation of both the
equilibrium payoffs and stopping times.
1.1. Background and contribution. In this section, we briefly review the math-
ematical literature on Dynkin games (some of the economic literature will also be
recalled in Section 1.2.1) and place our contribution in this context.
Zero-sum Dynkin games, in which G1 = −L2 and G2 = −L1, have a consid-
erable literature both in discrete and continuous time (see, for instance, [1, 2, 7,
10, 13, 17, 25–27, 36, 40, 42] and references therein) and in several papers the
structure of equilibria has been studied, beyond the question of their existence
and uniqueness. In contrast, the literature on nonzero-sum Dynkin games focuses
largely on the existence of Nash equilibria.
Such existence results have been given in both the discrete and the continu-
ous time settings, using a variety of sufficient conditions and methodologies. In
discrete time, the approaches applied include Tarski’s fixed-point theorem [29]
and martingale methods combined with a fixed-point theorem for monotone map-
pings [31]; see also [35] and [39]. In continuous time, the methodologies employed
include quasi-variational inequalities [33], the general theory of stochastic pro-
cesses [18] and the potential theory of Ray–Markov processes [9]; see also [20,
21, 27] and [28]. Beyond the question of existence, equilibrium payoffs (although
not strategies) are constructed by backward induction in [34]. Additional technical
questions arising in the continuous time setting, concerning appropriate notions of
subgame-perfect equilibrium, are considered in [38].
In the present paper, we take X to be a weak solution of a stochastic differen-
tial equation (SDE) on an interval I = (x, x) and employ probabilistic methods so
that, unlike in analytical settings such as that of [6], the coefficients of this SDE
are only assumed to be continuous. We provide sufficient conditions on the func-
tions Li and Gi for the existence of a Nash equilibrium whose strategies have the
structure (1.3), together with sufficient conditions for uniqueness of the equilib-
rium in this class. Our method is the following: we show that if player 1 stops at
the hitting time of a half-line (x, z1] then player 2’s best reply is the hitting time to
a half-line [z2,1, x) where z2,1 > z1 depends on z1. The same arguments produce
symmetric results if we start by letting player 2 stop at the hitting time of a half-
line [z2, x). The key point is then to show that there exists a fixed point, that is, a
couple of intervals (x, x∗1 ] and [x∗2 , x) such that the corresponding hitting times
are the best replies to one another and (1.3) forms an equilibrium. To construct
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each player’s best reply to the opponent’s stopping rule, we draw on the geometric
characterisation of r-excessive mappings due to Dynkin [16] and later generalised
in [12].
Our work complements recent related work by Attard [5] (see also [4]), which
became available during the final drafting of the present paper. In [5], the structure
of Nash equilibria is studied for regular linear diffusions absorbed at either 0 or 1.
Here, instead, we consider regular linear diffusions on an interval I ⊆ R killed
at a (possibly state-dependent) rate and cover all boundary behaviours which are
not nonsingular. The methodology in [5] differs from our approach, which is to
construct the solution by taking into account the geometry of the stopping cost
functions. In contrast in [5], the equilibrium payoffs are hypothesised to satisfy
the so-called double smooth-fit principle, according to which they are continu-
ously differentiable at the corresponding equilibrium stopping threshold x∗i . Based
on this principle, two coupled free boundary problems are formulated and solved
explicitly, producing functions u and v which can be verified as the equilibrium
payoffs of the game. In the present paper, we observe double smooth fit in some
equilibria (in particular see Section 3.1), but we also find equilibria outside this
setting (see Sections 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4). Finally, a more technical difference is that
due to the absorbing behaviour at 0 and 1, the main result in [5] (Theorem 4.1)
assumes that Gi(0) = Li(0) and Gi(1) = Li(1), i = 1,2 (here we use our notation
for the payoffs). We allow instead the limiting behaviour given in (2.10) and in
(2.18) below for Gi and Li , respectively.
1.2. Outline of main results. In order to present the main results, we first note
properties of the underlying regular diffusion X. In general, the behaviour of the
process X at the boundaries of I ⊆R may be of several types [22] and we will as-
sume that the upper endpoint of I is natural, while the lower one is not nonsingu-
lar: that is, either natural, exit-not-entrance or entrance-not-exit (see, for instance,
[8], Chapter 2, pages 18–20). For the unfamiliar reader, the terminology is ex-
plained in more detail in Section 2.2 where other analytical properties of X are
also addressed.
Beginning with the case of natural boundaries (which includes Brownian mo-
tion, geometric Brownian motion and the Ornstein–Uhlenbeck process), we estab-
lish sufficient conditions on Gi and Li (see the next section for details) for the ex-
istence of a Nash equilibrium (τ ∗1 , τ ∗2 ) of the threshold type (1.3). Under these con-
ditions, the smooth fit principle holds for the equilibrium payoff x → Ji (τ ∗1 , τ ∗2 ;x)
at the corresponding equilibrium threshold x∗i (i.e., the payoff is continuously dif-
ferentiable at x∗i ). These thresholds may therefore be characterised by a system of
algebraic equations. We then show that if the functions Li are assumed to have
appropriate smoothness, we may also provide sufficient conditions for the unique-
ness of the Nash equilibrium amongst strategies of the threshold type (1.3).
Analogous results are obtained in the case when the lower endpoint is either an
exit-not-entrance or an entrance-not-exit boundary, thus addressing Bessel pro-
cesses (depending on their parameters) and related processes such as the CIR
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(Cox–Ingersoll–Ross) and CEV (constant elasticity of variance) process. In these
settings, we also find equilibria in which one of the two players never stops, and
equilibria with a structure possibly more complex than (1.3) depending on the ini-
tial value of X (see Proposition 3.16).
We also indicate in Appendix A.3 the extension to a state dependent dis-
count factor. Other combinations of natural, exit-not-entrance and entrance-not-
exit boundaries may be addressed via the methods of this paper (indeed this is
immediate by symmetry when the lower boundary is natural and the upper one not
nonsingular).
1.2.1. Conditions on the problem data. We consider stopping costs Li and
Gi fulfilling suitable assumptions of integrability and smoothness (cf. Definitions
2.3, 2.4). Moreover, they satisfy the sufficient conditions applied below, which are
motivated by the threshold type equilibrium structure (1.3). For i = 1,2, these are:
(a) Li < Gi ,
(b) 1 ∩ 2 =∅, where i denotes the closure of i := {x : (LX − r)Gi(x) > 0}
and LX denotes the infinitesimal generator of X,
(c) the equation (LX − r)Gi(x) = 0 has a single root.
In our setup, player i chooses a stopping time τi , or equivalently a pure strategy
(see, e.g., [38] for discussion on pure and mixed strategies in continuous time). Our
requirement (a) specifies that each player locally has an incentive to act second:
in the context of stopping games, this is a war of attrition (see, e.g., [32]). It is
worth mentioning here that in the opposite situation, in which Li > Gi , each player
locally has an incentive to act first and the game belongs to the class of preemption
games; see, for example, [19] for a deterministic setting and [3, 41] for a stochastic
framework. In the literature on preemption games, equilibria are usually realised
in mixed rather than pure strategies. Requirement (a) is therefore reasonable in
a study of threshold-type strategies, which are pure strategies constructed from
hitting times.
Condition (b) addresses the cost functions Gi , which are the costs for stopping
first. An argument using Dynkin’s formula, which is standard in optimal stopping
and is also provided in Appendix A.4, establishes that player i will not stop on the
set {x : (LX − r)Gi(x) < 0}. Our requirement (b) therefore means that locally at
least one player is incentivised to wait rather than accepting the stopping cost. This
implies that the players do not stop simultaneously.
Motivated by the latter argument, let us temporarily fix the strategy of player i.
Then it is reasonable to suppose that if the function x → gj (x) := (LX − r)Gj (x),
j = 3− i, changes sign many times, the optimal strategy for player j (given player
i’s strategy) may involve several disjoint regions on which it is optimal to stop.
Since condition (c) ensures that the function gj changes sign at most once on I ,
this suggests that the optimal strategy for player j (given player i’s strategy) should
be to stop the process upon hitting a connected set. Indeed, this type of condition
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is commonly used in the literature on optimal stopping problems in order to ensure
that the solution is a stopping time of threshold type.
In principle, our techniques may also apply under conditions other than (a)–(c),
in which case equilibria with other structures can arise. This point is illustrated in
Section 3.4, where condition (b) is replaced by the following alternative:
(d) Either 1 ⊂ 2 or 2 ⊂ 1.
In this case, it is necessary to slightly generalise the structure of (1.3) as one of
the players may never stop. Such equilibria have been obtained in the economics
literature for instance by Murto [32] but in Section 3.4 we consider more general
specifications of the stochastic process X and of the stopping costs Li and Gi than
those used in [32].
Note that the threshold type structure we study has some degree of overlap
with that of some zero-sum games of optimal stopping (see, e.g., [2]). However,
a characterisation of the equilibrium stopping thresholds in our game cannot be
achieved via methods usually employed for zero-sum games. Indeed, in this paper,
we deal with the joint optimisation of the coupled system of payoffs (1.1)–(1.2).
The latter reduces to a simpler problem with a single payoff in the zero-sum case.
From a PDE point of view, this can be understood by noticing that a zero-sum game
is usually associated to a variational inequality (see, e.g., [2]) whereas a nonzero-
sum game must be associated to a system of coupled variational inequalities (see,
e.g., [6]).
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the nonzero-
sum Dynkin game, together with the dynamics and our assumptions and suffi-
cient conditions on the stopping costs. Existence and uniqueness results for Nash
equilibria of threshold type are proved in Section 3 for different combinations of
boundary behaviour. In Section 3.4, we consider slightly weaker assumptions on
the stopping costs. In the Appendix, we generalise our results to state dependent
discount factors and provide some auxiliary proofs.
2. Setting. We begin by formally stating the game presented in the Introduc-
tion and by providing a rigorous definition of a Nash equilibrium in Section 2.1.
Then we describe the class of diffusions involved in the optimisation (see Sec-
tion 2.2), whose analytical properties are finally used in Sections 2.3 and 2.4 to
characterise the class of stopping costs to be used in the game, that is, Gi , Li ,
i = 1,2 in (1.1) and (1.2).
2.1. The nonzero-sum Dynkin game. On a complete filtered probability space
(,F,P) equipped with a filtration F = (Ft )t≥0 which satisfies the standard as-
sumptions, we consider a real-valued diffusion process X := (Xt)t≥0. Its state
space is an interval I ⊆R and we denote the explosion time by
σI := inf{t ≥ 0 : Xt /∈ I}.(2.1)
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Further details concerning the diffusion X will be provided in the next section.
In order to formally introduce the two-player nonzero-sum game of stopping,
we denote
T := {τ : τ is an F-stopping time and τ ≤ σI a.s.},
and when no confusion may arise we also denote player 1 by P1 and player 2 by P2.
For a given τ2 ∈ T , player P1 aims at minimising the payoff J1(τ1, τ2;x) in (1.1)
by optimally choosing their stopping time τ1 ∈ T . Analogously, given τ1 ∈ T , P2
chooses the stopping time τ2 ∈ T in order to minimise J2(τ1, τ2;x) in (1.2).
In order to cover the events ω for which σI(ω) = +∞, for any real-valued Borel
function f and any τ ∈ T , we set
e−rτ f (Xτ )1{τ=+∞} = 0 Px-a.s. for all x ∈ I.(2.2)
Before proceeding further, we provide the definition of Nash equilibrium.
DEFINITION 2.1. For x ∈ I , we say that a couple (τ1, τ2) ∈ T × T is a Nash
equilibrium for the two-player nonzero-sum game of optimal stopping, started at
x, if and only if
(2.3)
{
J1(τ1, τ2;x) ≤ J1(ρ, τ2;x) ∀ρ ∈ T ,
J2(τ1, τ2;x) ≤ J2(τ1, ρ;x) ∀ρ ∈ T .
We also say that vi(x) := Ji(τ1, τ2;x) is the corresponding equilibrium payoff for
the ith player. Further, if the couple (τ1, τ2) is an equilibrium in the game started
at x for each x ∈ I , we simply say that (τ1, τ2) is a Nash equilibrium.
2.2. The underlying diffusion. Let B = (Bt )t≥0 be a one-dimensional stan-
dard Brownian motion on (,F,P) adapted to F, then our diffusion X is defined
as follows. The triple (,F,P),F, (X,B) is a weak solution of the stochastic dif-
ferential equation (SDE)
(2.4) dXt = μ(Xt) dt + σ(Xt) dBt , X0 = x ∈ I,
for some Borel-measurable functions μ :R→R and σ :R→R+ to be specified.
To account for the dependence of X on its initial position, from now on we shall
write Xx where appropriate and Px to refer to the probability measure such that
Px(·) = P(·|X0 = x), x ∈ I . Throughout the paper, we will equivalently use the
notation E[f (Xxt )] and Ex[f (Xt)], f : R → R Borel-measurable and integrable,
to refer to expectations under the measure Px .
We denote by I the closure of I and assume that I = (x, x) ⊆ R so that x and
x are (not necessarily finite) boundary points for X. The upper boundary point
x is assumed to be natural, whereas the lower one x is either natural, exit-not-
entrance or entrance-not-exit (see, for instance, Chapter 2, pages 18–20, of [8] for
a characterisation of the boundary behaviour of diffusions). We recall that x (or
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equivalently x) is natural if the process cannot start from there and when starting
from x ∈ I it cannot reach x (resp., x) in finite time; x is exit-not-entrance if the
process cannot start from x but can reach it in finite time (hence σI < +∞ with
positive probability); finally x is entrance-not-exit if the process can start from x
but it cannot reach it in finite time when started from x ∈ I .
For the coefficients of the SDE (2.4), we make the following assumption, which
will hold throughout the paper.
ASSUMPTION 2.2. The functions μ and σ are continuous in I with σ 2 > 0
in I .
As a consequence of the above assumption, one has that for every y ∈ I there
exists εo > 0 such that ∫ y+εo
y−εo
1 + |μ(ξ)|
|σ(ξ)|2 dξ < +∞.
The latter guarantees that (2.4) has indeed a weak solution that is unique in the
sense of probability law (up to the time σI ; cf. [24], Chapter 5.5).
We now recall some basic analytical properties of diffusions, which are also
going to be used later on to characterise the functions Gi , Li appearing as stopping
costs in the game [recall (1.1) and (1.2)]. We refer the reader to Chapter 2 of [8]
for a detailed exposition. Under Assumption 2.2, the diffusion process X is regular
in I; that is, if
τ(y) := inf{t ≥ 0 : Xt = y}(2.5)
one has Px(τ (y) < ∞) > 0 for every x and y in I so that the state space cannot be
decomposed into smaller sets from which X cannot exit. The continuity of μ and
σ imply that the scale function has derivative
S′(x) := exp
(
−
∫ x
xo
2μ(ξ)
σ 2(ξ)
dξ
)
, x ∈ I,
for any fixed reference point xo ∈ I , and the speed measure has density
m′(x) := 2
σ 2(x)S′(x)
, x ∈ I.
We define the infinitesimal generator LX of X by
(LXu)(x) := 12σ
2(x)u′′(x)+ μ(x)u′(x), x ∈ I,
for any u ∈ C2(I). Then, for fixed r > 0, under Assumption 2.2 there always ex-
ist two linearly independent, strictly positive solutions of the ordinary differential
equation LXu = ru satisfying a set of boundary conditions based on the boundary
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behaviour of X (see, e.g., pages 18–19 of [8]). These functions span the set of so-
lutions of LXu = ru and are uniquely defined up to multiplication if one of them
is required to be strictly increasing and the other one to be strictly decreasing. We
denote the strictly increasing solution ψr and the strictly decreasing one φr . For
x, y ∈ I and τ(y) as in (2.5), one has
Ex
[
e−rτ (y)
]=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
ψr(x)
ψr(y)
x < y,
φr(x)
φr(y)
x > y.
(2.6)
We recall that the Wronskian
(2.7) W := ψ
′
r (x)φr(x)− φ′r (x)ψr(x)
S′(x)
, x ∈ I,
is a positive constant and we introduce the Green function
r(x, y) := W−1 ·
{
ψr(x)φr(y) x ≤ y,
φr(x)ψr(y) x ≥ y.
The latter can be used to obtain the representation formula for the resolvent
(2.8) Ex
[∫ σI
0
e−rtf (Xt) dt
]
=
∫
I
f (y)r(x, y)m′(y) dy, x ∈ I,
which holds for any continuous function f : I → R such that the integrals are
well defined. Moreover the following useful equations hold for any x < a < b < x
(cf. paragraph 10, Chapter 2 of [8]):
ψ ′r (b)
S′(b)
− ψ
′
r (a)
S′(a)
= r
∫ b
a
ψr(y)m
′(y) dy,
(2.9)
φ′r (b)
S′(b)
− φ
′
r (a)
S′(a)
= r
∫ b
a
φr(y)m
′(y) dy.
2.3. Classes of stopping cost functions. In order to clarify the assumptions
concerning the stopping costs Gi , Li , i = 1,2 appearing in (1.1) and (1.2) we
need first to introduce the class of functions below.
DEFINITION 2.3. Let A be the class of real valued functions H ∈ C2(I) such
that
lim
x→x
H
φr
(x) = 0, lim
x→x
H
ψr
(x) = 0,(2.10)
and Ex
[∫ σI
0
e−rt
∣∣h(Xt)∣∣dt]< ∞(2.11)
for all x ∈ I and with h(x) := (LXH − rH)(x).
120 T. DE ANGELIS, G. FERRARI AND J. MORIARTY
In this paper, elements of A will be often denoted by H and then the corre-
sponding lower case letter h will denote the function h(x) := (LXH − rH)(x).
We provide some formulae for functions in A which will be useful in the rest of
the paper. Using Itô’s formula, (2.10) and standard localisation arguments one can
show that for H ∈A we have
(2.12) H(x) = −Ex
[∫ σI
0
e−rth(Xt) dt
]
, x ∈ I.
Then applying the representation (2.8), we get the equivalent expression
H(x) = −W−1
[
φr(x)
∫ x
x
ψr(y)h(y)m
′(y) dy
(2.13)
+ψr(x)
∫ x
x
φr(y)h(y)m
′(y) dy
]
and straightforward calculations also give(
H
φr
)′
(x) = − 1
W
(
ψr
φr
)′
(x)
∫ x
x
φr(y)h(y)m
′(y) dy.(2.14)
For our study, we also consider the following subsets of A.
DEFINITION 2.4. We say that H ∈A lies in the class A1 if h(·) has a unique
zero at xh ∈ I and lim infx→x h(x) > 0 and lim supx→x h(x) < 0. Alternatively,
we say that H ∈A2 if −H ∈A1.
Several proofs below use a geometric approach to optimal stopping which re-
quires the following change of variables. As in [12], equation (4.6), we define the
strictly increasing function
(2.15) Fr(x) := ψr(x)
φr(x)
, x ∈ I,
together with its inverse function F−1r and for any continuous real function H on
I we set
Hˆ (y) :=
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
(
H
φr
)
◦ F−1r (y) y > 0,
0 y = 0.
(2.16)
In what follows (see for, e.g., Lemma 3.1) for H ∈Ai , i = 1,2, we denote
yˆh := Fr(xh).
For the benefit of the unfamiliar reader, we provide in Appendix A.1 a proof of
the next well-known result (see also Section 6, page 192 in [12]).
LEMMA 2.5. Let x1, x2 ∈ I and set yi := Fr(xi), i = 1,2. Moreover, let H ∈
C2(I) and define Hˆ as in (2.16) and h := (LX − r)H . Then
Hˆ (y) is strictly convex on (y1, y2) ⇐⇒ h(x) > 0 on (x1, x2).(2.17)
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2.4. Sufficient conditions on the stopping costs and notation. Here, we formu-
late the statements (a), (b) and (c) of Section 1.2.1 in the above setting. We will
show in Section 3 that these conditions are sufficient for the existence of Nash
equilibria of threshold type (1.3). It is convenient to recall the notation i for the
closure of the sets i := {x ∈ I : (LX − r)Gi(x) > 0}, i = 1,2.
ASSUMPTION 2.6. (i) For i = 1,2, we have Li,Gi ∈ C(I;R) with Li < Gi
on I;
(ii) G1 ∈A1 and G2 ∈A2 with 1 ∩ 2 =∅;
(iii) for i = 1,2, we have
lim sup
x→x
∣∣∣∣Liφr
∣∣∣∣(x) < +∞ and lim sup
x→x
∣∣∣∣Liψr
∣∣∣∣(x) < +∞.(2.18)
In fact, parts (i) and (ii) slightly refine conditions (a), (b) and (c) of Section 1.2.1,
since we now require the sign of (LX − r)Gi to be asymptotically nonzero at the
endpoints of I . We have introduced condition (iii) to ensure the finiteness of the
game’s payoffs (see, e.g., [12]).
It is useful to introduce also some notation related to the above assumptions on
the stopping costs. We recall (2.16) and for i = 1,2 we set Gˆi and Lˆi to be the
transformations of Gi , Li .
DEFINITION 2.7 (Notation). For i = 1,2 and Gi ∈Ai , we define:
1. gi(x) := (LX − r)Gi(x), x ∈ I;
2. xˆi the unique point at which the sign of gi(x) changes and yˆi := Fr(xˆi);
3. yi the unique stationary point of Gˆi in (0, yˆi), whenever it exists.
For i = 1,2 and Li ∈Ai , we define:
4. i(x) := (LX − r)Li(x), x ∈ I;
5. xˇi the unique point at which the sign of i(x) changes and yˇi := Fr(xˇi);
6. y˜i the unique stationary point of Lˆi in (0, yˇi), whenever it exists.
Notice that Gˆi and Lˆi as in Definition 2.7 have at most one stationary point in
(0, yˆi) and (0, yˇi), respectively, due to Lemma 2.5. Note also that in this setting
1 ∩ 2 =∅ ⇐⇒ xˆ1 < xˆ2.
REMARK 2.8. For natural and entrance-not-exit boundaries, we have φr(x) ↑
+∞ as x ↓ x and ψr(x) ↑ +∞ as x ↑ x so that bounded functions Gi satisfy
(2.10), for example. In the case of an exit-not-entrance boundary which is explored
in Section 3.3, however, (2.10) is more restrictive and so it is relaxed in the latter
section, yielding an additional term in (2.12) [cf. (3.41)]. We also note that all the
results in this paper remain true if in the definition of A the regularity of H is
weakened by requiring H ∈ W 2,∞loc (I).
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3. Construction of Nash equilibria. In this section, we develop our exis-
tence and uniqueness results under different combinations of diffusion boundary
behaviour. We are then able to provide an algebraic characterisation of the optimal
thresholds, as a system of two equations in two unknowns (or reducing in special
cases to one equation in one unknown, with another threshold formally located
at one of the endpoints x and x). We begin in Section 3.1 under the assumption
that the endpoints x < x of I are natural for X, then consider an entrance-not-
exit lower boundary x in Section 3.2 and an exit-not-entrance lower boundary in
Section 3.3.
3.1. The case of natural boundaries. When x and x are both natural boundary
points, we have (see paragraph 10, Section 2 of [8]):
lim
x↓x ψr(x) = 0, limx↓x φr(x) = ∞,
(3.1)
lim
x↑x ψr(x) = ∞, limx↑x φr(x) = 0,
lim
x↓x
ψ ′r (x)
S′(x)
= 0, lim
x↓x
φ′r (x)
S′(x)
= −∞,
(3.2)
lim
x↑x
ψ ′r (x)
S′(x)
= ∞, lim
x↑x
φ′r (x)
S′(x)
= 0.
The following lemma provides geometric properties associated with the classes
A1, A2 of Definition 2.4, and is proved in the Appendix.
LEMMA 3.1. Let H ∈A1 (resp., A2). Then Hˆ :
(i) is strictly convex (resp., concave) on (0, yˆh) and strictly concave (resp.,
convex) on (yˆh,∞);
(ii) satisfies Hˆ (0+) = 0 and Hˆ ′(0+) = −∞ (resp., +∞);
(iii) has a unique global minimum (resp., maximum) in (0, yˆh) and
limy→∞ Hˆ (y) = +∞ (resp., −∞); finally Hˆ is monotonic increasing (resp., de-
creasing) on (yˆh,+∞).
In order to prove our main results, for i = 1,2 and u, v > 0 let us introduce the
functions:
Li (u, v) := Gˆi(u)− Lˆi(v) − Gˆ′i (u)(u− v).(3.3)
THEOREM 3.2 (Existence of an equilibrium). Under Assumption 2.6, there
exists a solution (y∗1 , y∗2 ) of the problem
(3.4) Find (y1, y2) ∈ (0, yˆ1)× (yˆ2,+∞) such that
{
L1(y1, y2) = 0,
L2(y2, y1) = 0.
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Writing x∗1 := F−1r (y∗1 ) ∈ (x, xˆ1) and x∗2 := F−1r (y∗2 ) ∈ (xˆ2, x) and recalling (1.4),
the couple
(3.5) τ ∗1 = τ1
(
x∗1
)
, τ ∗2 = τ2
(
x∗2
)
is a Nash equilibrium.
PROOF. The proof is divided into three steps. In Step 1, we assume that P1
picks a stopping time τ1(z) as defined in (1.4), for some z ∈ (x, xˆ1). We then
construct P2’s best reply, showing that it has the form τ2(x2) as defined in (1.4),
for some x2 ∈ (xˆ2, x) which depends on z. Step 2 reverses the roles of the two
players, and in Step 3 we combine these results to construct a Nash equilibrium.
Step 1 (Player 2’s best reply). Given P1’s choice τ1(z) described above, P2 is
faced with an optimal stopping problem of the form
(3.6) inf
τ∈T Ex
[
e−rτG2(Xτ )1{τ≤τ1(z)} + L2(Xτ1(z))e−rτ1(z)1{τ>τ1(z)}
]
.
Setting ζ := Fr(z), it is shown in Proposition A.1 that if the equation
L2(·, ζ ) = 0(3.7)
has a solution y2(ζ ) ∈ (yˆ2,+∞) (which is therefore unique), then the stopping
time τ2(x2) with
x2 = x2(z) := F−1r
(
y2(ζ )
)
is optimal in (3.6). In the rest of this step, we prove existence and uniqueness of
the solution y2(ζ ) ∈ (yˆ2,+∞) to (3.7).
Notice that ζ ∈ (0, yˆ1), hence ζ < yˆ2, and by strict concavity of Gˆ2 on (0, yˆ2)
one has
Gˆ′2(yˆ2)(yˆ2 − ζ ) < Gˆ2(yˆ2)− Gˆ2(ζ ).(3.8)
By substituting the above inequality into (3.3), we get
L2(yˆ2, ζ ) > Gˆ2(ζ )− Lˆ2(ζ ) > 0(3.9)
[noting that Gˆ2 > Lˆ2 by (i) in Assumption 2.6]. Also, u → L2(u, ζ ) is decreasing
for u ∈ (yˆ2,+∞) since ∂∂uL2(u, ζ ) = −Gˆ′′2(u)(u − ζ ) < 0 by the convexity of Gˆ2
and the fact that ζ < yˆ1 < yˆ2 < u.
Next, we show that L2(u, ζ ) → −∞ as u → +∞. To this end, note that Gˆ2 is
decreasing on (yˆ2,+∞) (Lemma 3.1), so
lim
u→∞
[
Gˆ2(u)− Gˆ′2(u)(u− ζ )
]≤ lim
u→∞
[
Gˆ2(u)− Gˆ′2(u)u
]
.(3.10)
Since Lˆ2 is bounded on (0, yˆ1) (Assumption 2.6), from (3.3) it is now sufficient to
establish that the latter limit equals −∞.
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The chain rule and (2.14) (taking H = G2 and h = g2) give
Gˆ′2(u)u =
u
F ′r (F−1r (u))
(
G2
φr
)′(
F−1r (u)
)= − u
W
∫ x
F−1r (u)
φr(t)g2(t)m
′(t) dt.
Setting u = Fr(s), s ∈ I , from (2.13) we obtain
Gˆ2(u)− Gˆ′2(u)u = −W−1
∫ s
x
ψr(t)g2(t)m
′(t) dt.(3.11)
Fix δ > 0. By the conditions on our stopping costs, the function g2 is bounded
below on [xˆ2 + δ, x) by a constant εδ > 0. When s > xˆ2 + δ, we split the integral
above on the intervals (x, xˆ2 + δ] and [xˆ2 + δ, x), then use the bound on g2 and
(2.9) to obtain that
Gˆ2(u)− Gˆ′2(u)u(3.12)
≤ −W−1
[∫ xˆ2+δ
x
ψr(t)g2(t)m
′(t) dt + εδ
r
(
ψ ′r (s)
S′(s)
− ψ
′
r (xˆ2 + δ)
S′(xˆ2 + δ)
)]
which tends to −∞ as s ↑ x by (3.2). This completes Step 1.
As we will see in the proof of Proposition 3.4, equation (3.7) may be interpreted
as a geometric version of the so called smooth-fit equation for P2, which specifies
that (3.6) should be continuously differentiable in x across the optimal boundary
x∗2 . From the arbitrariness of z ∈ (x, xˆ1) and a simple application of the implicit
function theorem, we obtain that the map z → x2(z) is continuous on (x, xˆ1), or
equivalently y2(·) ∈ C((0, yˆ1)) (see, e.g., Theorem 10.2.1 on page 270 of [14]).
Step 2 (Player 1’s best reply) Similarly, suppose that P2 picks z ∈ (xˆ2, x) and
decides to stop at time τ2(z). Then P1 is faced with an optimal stopping problem
of the form:
(3.13) inf
τ∈T Ex
[
e−rτG1(Xτ )1{τ<τ2(z)} +L1(Xτ2(z))e−rτ2(z)1{τ≥τ2(z)}
]
.
It may be proven just as in Step 1 that [with ζ := Fr(z)] the equation
L1(·, ζ ) = 0(3.14)
has a unique solution y1(ζ ) ∈ (0, yˆ1). Notice by (3.14) that y1(ζ ) > 0 is guaranteed
in this setting, by observing that Gˆ′1(0+) = −∞ (see Lemma 3.1). Then an optimal
stopping time for P1 is τ1(x1) where the optimal boundary point is x1 = x1(z) :=
F−1r (y1(ζ )) (see Appendix A.4.2).
Again, the map z → x1(z) is continuous on (xˆ2, x) [or equivalently y1(·) ∈
C((yˆ2,+∞))] by the implicit function theorem and arbitrariness of z.
Step 3 (A fixed point). With the continuous functions x2(·), x1(·) defined as in
Steps 1 and 2 respectively, suppose now that there exist two points x∗1 , x∗2 ∈ I with
x∗1 < x∗2 such that
x∗2 = x2
(
x∗1
)
,(3.15)
x∗1 = x1
(
x∗2
)
.(3.16)
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Let us take τ ∗1 = τ1(x∗1 ), τ ∗2 = τ2(x∗2 ) and show that they form a Nash equilibrium
(Definition 2.1). Since Step 1 constructs P2’s best response to τ ∗1 over all stopping
times τ ∈ T , we have from (3.15) that the lower inequality in (2.3) is satisfied.
Similarly, Step 2 implies that the upper inequality in (2.3) is satisfied, and so the
pair (τ ∗1 , τ ∗2 ) is a Nash equilibrium. In this step, we will therefore establish the
existence of x∗1 < x∗2 satisfying (3.15)–(3.16).
We thus seek y∗2 ∈ (yˆ2,+∞) such that L2(y∗2 , y1(y∗2 )) = 0. By the regularity
of G2, L2 and y1, we have u → L2(u, y1(u)) continuous on (yˆ2,+∞). We con-
clude just as in (3.8) and (3.9) that L2(yˆ2, y1(yˆ2)) > 0. Since the point ζ ∈ (0, yˆ1)
in (3.10) does not need to be constant for the latter inequality to hold, the proof
of Step 1 also gives that limu↑+∞L2(u, y1(u)) = −∞ and we conclude that
L2(·, y1(·)) has a root y∗2 . From Step 1, we know that L2(·, y1(y∗2 )) = 0 has a
unique solution, denoted by y2(y1(y∗2 )), hence y∗2 = y2(y1(y∗2 )). Therefore, setting
y∗1 := y1(y∗2 ), we have obtained a solution of (3.15)–(3.16) with x∗1 := F−1r (y∗1 )
and x∗2 := F−1r (y∗2 ). 
It is worth observing that if (y1, y2) ∈ (0, yˆ1)×(yˆ2,+∞) is an arbitrary solution
of (3.4), then in particular y2 is the unique solution of L2(·, y1) = 0 in (yˆ2,+∞) by
Step 1 in the proof above. Therefore, recalling (1.4) and Step 1, the stopping time
τ2(x2) with x2 := F−1r (y2) is optimal in (3.6) when z = F−1r (y1) =: x1. Analo-
gously, from Step 2 we find that τ1(x1) is optimal in (3.13) when z = x2 and,
therefore, the couple (τ1(x1), τ2(x2)) forms a Nash equilibrium.
Conversely, suppose that a couple (τ1(x1), τ2(x2)), x1 < x2, forms a Nash equi-
librium in the class of threshold-type strategies (1.4). Then from Step 1, we
have that y2 := Fr(x2) must be the solution of L2(·, y1) = 0 in (yˆ2,+∞), with
y1 := Fr(x1). Similarly, Step 2 implies that y1 solves L1(·, y2) = 0 in (0, yˆ1).
Therefore, we have established an equivalence which is summarised in the next
corollary.
COROLLARY 3.3. Let Assumption 2.6 hold. A couple (τˆ1, τˆ2) := (τ1(x1),
τ2(x2)), with x < x1 < x2 < x, forms a Nash equilibrium in the class of threshold-
type strategies (1.3) if and only if y1 = Fr(x1) and y2 = Fr(x2) are a solution of
problem (3.4).
Next, we verify some analytical expressions associated to the equilibrium pay-
offs constructed above. We apply Itô’s formula but note that direct calculations
involving the Laplace transforms of τ ∗i , i = 1,2 (see Theorem 3.2) and the equi-
librium payoffs of the game would also suffice.
PROPOSITION 3.4. Let Assumption 2.6 hold and let (y1, y2) ∈ (0, yˆ1) ×
(yˆ2,+∞) be a solution of (3.4). With x1, x2, τˆ1, τˆ2 as in Corollary 3.3, (τˆ1, τˆ2)
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forms a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, the functions
(3.17) v1(x) :=
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
G1(x) x ≤ x1,
m1ψr(x)+ q1φr(x) x1 < x < x2,
L1(x) x ≥ x2,
and
(3.18) v2(x) :=
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
L2(x) x ≤ x1,
m2ψr(x)+ q2φr(x) x1 < x < x2,
G2(x) x ≥ x2,
with
m1 := (G1/φr)(x1)− (L1/φr)(x2)
Fr(x1)− Fr(x2) , q1 :=
L1
φr
(x2)−m1Fr(x2),(3.19)
m2 := (G2/φr)(x2)− (L2/φr)(x1)
Fr(x2)− Fr(x1) , q2 :=
L2
φr
(x1)−m2Fr(x1),(3.20)
coincide with the equilibrium payoffs of the two players, that is, vi(x) =
Ji(τˆ1, τˆ2;x), i = 1,2. In particular, v1 ∈ C(I) with v1 ∈ W 2,∞loc (x, x2), v2 ∈ C(I)
with v2 ∈ W 2,∞loc (x1, x) and they solve:
(LX − r)vi(x) = 0, x1 < x < x2, i = 1,2,(3.21)
(LX − r)v1(x) > 0, x < x < x1,(3.22)
(LX − r)v2(x) > 0, x2 < x < x,(3.23)
vi ≤ Gi, x ∈ I, i = 1,2.(3.24)
PROOF. The fact that (τˆ1, τˆ2) defines a Nash equilibrium follows from Corol-
lary 3.3. The rest of the proof is organised in three steps.
Step 1 (Regularity of vi ). At this point, we recall the smooth change of variables
defined in (2.16), writing x = F−1r (y). Applying this change of variables to v1
in (3.17), the function y → vˆ1(y) is a straight line on (y1, y2). The coefficients of
this straight line, given in (3.19), ensure that vˆ1 is continuous on (0,∞), and hence
that v1 ∈ C(I).
Further by the definition of L1 in (3.3), it follows from the system (3.4) that the
gradient of this straight line is equal to the derivative of Gˆ1 at y1. We conclude that
vˆ1 is continuously differentiable at y1 or, equivalently, that v1 is continuously dif-
ferentiable at x1. In this sense, equation (3.14) is a geometric version of the smooth
fit equation for v1. It follows immediately that v1 is continuously differentiable on
(x, x2). Similarly by direct calculations and (3.17)–(3.18) we can check that v′′1
is indeed a locally bounded function on (x, x2), hence v1 ∈ W 2,∞loc (x, x2). We can
proceed in a similar way for v2.
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Step 2 (Free boundary problem). The equations (3.21), (3.22) and (3.23) follow
directly from the definition of vi , by recalling that φr and ψr solve LXu− ru = 0,
and by the fact that x1 < xˆ1 and x2 > xˆ2. For the final inequalities (the so-called
obstacle conditions), we refer again to the transformation (2.16). The transformed
function Gˆ1 is convex in (0, yˆ1), it reaches its unique global minimum therein
and it is concave in (yˆ1,+∞). By the smooth fit property established above at
y1 ∈ (0, yˆ1), it follows from vˆ1(y2) = Lˆ1(y2) < Gˆ1(y2) that we must also have
vˆ1 ≤ Gˆ1 on (y1, y2). Therefore, we have v1 ≤ G1 in (x, x2) and v1 = L1 < G1 in
[x2, x). Symmetric arguments hold for v2.
Step 3 (Verification argument). Here, we show that indeed vi , i = 1,2 coincide
with the equilibrium payoffs. As a byproduct, this step offers an alternative way of
showing that (τˆ1, τˆ2) is a Nash equilibrium, starting from the solution of (3.21)–
(3.24) (this is the original approach of [6]).
Let σ ∈ T be arbitrary. Then we have
v1(x) = Ex
[
e−r(σ∧τˆ2)v1(Xσ∧τˆ2)−
∫ σ∧τˆ2
0
e−rt (LX − r)v1(Xt) dt
]
≤ Ex[e−rσG1(Xxσ )1{σ<τˆ2} + e−rτˆ2L1(Xτˆ2)1{σ≥τˆ2}](3.25)
= J1(σ, τˆ2;x).
Here, the first line follows from the Itô–Tanaka formula (justified by the regular-
ity of v1) and a standard localisation argument, and the second line follows from
(3.17), (3.21), (3.22) and (3.24). In particular, setting σ = τˆ1 in (3.25) we obtain
v1(x) = J1(τˆ1, τˆ2;x). Arguing similarly for v2 yields the claimed equivalence of
vi , i = 1,2 with the equilibrium payoffs. 
The application of Itô’s formula in Step 3 of the latter proof also yields the
following (sub)-martingale property of the processes t → e−rt vi(Xt), i = 1,2.
This is the analogue in our game setting of the well-established (sub)-martingale
property in optimal stopping problems with minimisation over stopping times (see,
e.g., [37], Chapter 5, Section 2.3).
COROLLARY 3.5. Let (τˆ1, τˆ2) be as in Proposition 3.4 and vi , i = 1,2 the
related equilibrium payoffs for the two players. For i, j = 1,2, i = j , and t ≥ 0 set
Y it := e−rt vi(Xt ), Git := e−rtGi(Xt), Lit := e−rtLi(Xt).(3.26)
Then (Y i
t∧τˆj )t≥0 is a continuous submartingale, (Y
i
t∧τˆi∧τˆj )t≥0 is a continuous mar-
tingale, Y it ≤ Git for all t ≥ 0 and Y iτˆi∧τˆj = Giτˆi1{τˆi<τˆj } + Liτˆj1{τˆi>τˆj } [notice that
Px(τˆ1 = τˆ2) = 0 for all x ∈ I].
Our nonzero-sum game may have multiple Nash equilibria but we now provide
sufficient conditions under which the equilibrium of Theorem 3.2 is unique in the
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class (1.3). For this, we will consider the auxiliary problem
inf
τ∈T Ex
[
e−rτG2(Xτ )
]
, x ∈ I,(3.27)
which corresponds to the optimal stopping problem for P2 if P1 decides never to
stop. The proof of the next lemma is standard and we provide it in Appendix A.2.
LEMMA 3.6. There is a unique solution y∞2 in (yˆ2,+∞) of Gˆ′2(y)y −
Gˆ2(y) = 0. Setting x∞2 := F−1r (y∞2 ) > xˆ2 and recalling (1.4), the stopping time
τ∞2 := τ2(x∞2 ) is an optimal stopping time for (3.27).
Let y∞1 be the unique y ∈ (0, yˆ1) that solves L1(·, y∞2 ) = 0, whose existence
we know from Step 2 in the proof of Theorem 3.2. Then the latter arguments also
give us the next corollary.
COROLLARY 3.7. Set x∞1 := F−1r (y∞1 ) < xˆ1. Then τ∞1 := τ1(x∞1 ) [see (1.4)]
provides the best reply of P1 when P2 stops at τ∞2 .
For future reference, it is worth recalling that the optimal stopping problem for
P1 when P2 stops at τ∞2 is
inf
τ∈T Ex
[
e−rτG1(Xτ )1{τ<τ∞2 } + e−rτ
∞
2 L1(Xτ∞2 )1{τ≥τ∞2 }
]
, x ∈ I.(3.28)
Recalling y˜i , i = 1,2, from Definition 2.7 we are now ready to state our unique-
ness result.
THEOREM 3.8 (Uniqueness of the equilibrium). Let Assumption 2.6 hold and
let us also assume:
(i) Li ∈Ai , i = 1,2.
(ii) y˜2 > yˆ1.
(iii) Gˆ′1(y∞1 ) < Lˆ′1(y∞2 ).
Then problem (3.4) has a unique solution. Writing x∗i = F−1r (y∗i ), i = 1,2, then
(x∗1 , x∗2 ) is the unique couple such that (τ1(x∗1 ), τ2(x∗2 )) as in (1.3) constitutes a
Nash equilibrium for the game.
PROOF. The main idea of the proof is to show that the functions ζ → yi(ζ )
for i = 1,2 found in the proof of Theorem 3.2 are monotonic, respectively, in-
creasing and decreasing, so that they intersect at most once and (3.15)–(3.16) has
a unique solution. Uniqueness of the equilibrium [in the class (1.3)] then follows
by Corollary 3.3. We adopt the notation of Theorem 3.2 and observe that under the
additional regularity assumptions on Li the implicit function theorem implies that
yi(·) ∈ C1(Oi ) with i = 1,2 and O1 := (yˆ2,+∞), O2 := (0, yˆ1). In fact, denoting
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by ∂kLi the partial derivative of Li with respect to the kth variable k = 1,2, the
implicit function theorem gives
y ′i (ζ ) = −
∂2Li
∂1Li
(
yi(ζ ), ζ
)
(3.29)
= Gˆ
′
i(yi(ζ ))− Lˆ′i (ζ )
Gˆ′′i (yi(ζ ))(yi(ζ )− ζ )
, ζ ∈Oi , i = 1,2.
Step 1 (y2 is monotonic decreasing). First, we want to prove that y2(·) de-
creases monotonically on O2. For ζ ∈ O2, it holds y2(ζ ) > yˆ2 > ζ . Hence, by
Lemma 3.1(i) we have Gˆ′′2(y2(ζ ))(y2(ζ ) − ζ ) > 0 because Gˆ2 is convex, and
Gˆ′2(y2(ζ )) < 0 by Lemma 3.1(iii). By assumption (ii), we also have Lˆ′2(ζ ) > 0
for ζ ∈ O2, since Lˆ2 is increasing on (0, y˜2) by Lemma 3.1. Therefore, we have
from (3.29) that y2 is decreasing on O2 as claimed. From Lemma 3.6, we find the
maximum value y2(0+) = y∞2 .
Since the optimal boundaries constructed in Theorem 3.2 have the fixed-point
property that y∗1 = y1(y2(y∗1 )) [cf. (3.15)–(3.16)], it is sufficient to show mono-
tonicity of ζ → y1(ζ ) on the interval ζ ∈ (yˆ2, y∞2 ), which contains the range of
y2(·). This is done in the next step.
Step 2 (y1 is monotonic increasing). Taking ζ ∈ O1, we have y1(ζ ) ∈ O2 and
by (i) of Lemma 3.1 we have Gˆ′′1(y1(ζ ))(y1(ζ )− ζ ) < 0. Corollary 3.7 and Step 2
in the proof of Theorem 3.2 justify setting y∞1 = y1(y∞2 ). Hence, we can write
Gˆ′1(y1(y∞2 )) = Gˆ′1(y∞1 ) and since we are assuming Gˆ′1(y∞1 ) < Lˆ′1(y∞2 ), then
y′1
(
y∞2
)
> 0.(3.30)
Let us now study the sign of the function U : (yˆ2, y∞2 ) → R, where U(ζ ) :=
Gˆ′1(y1(ζ )) − Lˆ′1(ζ ). Assume that U has a zero at ζ o1 or, equivalently, that
y′1(ζ o1 ) = 0. Then since L1(y1(ζ o1 ), ζ o1 ) = 0 [cf. (3.3)] and U(ζo1 ) = 0, there is a
straight line which is tangent both to Lˆ1, at ζ o1 , and to Gˆ1, at y1(ζ o1 ). Since Lˆ1 is
convex for y < yˇ1 and Lˆ1 < Gˆ1 it is easy to see that we must have ζ o1 > yˇ1, other-
wise the tangent would lie below Lˆ1 on (0, ζ o1 ) and violate Lˆ1 < Gˆ1 at y1(ζ
o
1 ).
Now we claim that if such ζ o1 exists, then
U > 0 and y′1 < 0 on
(
ζ o1 , y
∞
2
)
.(3.31)
Since the latter inequality would contradict (3.30), it would then follow that y′1(·)
must be strictly positive on (yˆ2, y∞2 ).
Hence, to conclude it remains to prove (3.31). For this, we use y′1(ζ o1 ) = 0 and
observe that
(3.32) U ′(ζ o1 )= (Gˆ′′1(y1(ζ ))y′1(ζ )− Lˆ′′1(ζ ))|ζ=ζ o1 = −Lˆ′′1(ζ o1 )> 0,
since ζ o1 > yˇ1. Hence, U may only equal zero with strictly positive derivative, so
it has at most one zero ζ o1 and then (3.31) holds.
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Step 3 [Uniqueness of the solution to (3.4)]. From Theorem 3.2, we know that
there exists (y∗1 , y∗2 ) ∈ O2 × O1 such that y∗2 = y2(y∗1 ) and y∗1 = y1(y∗2 ). The
monotonicity of both y1 and y2 obtained above implies that this pair is unique
in O2 ×O1, and hence there is a unique solution to (3.4). 
3.2. The case of an entrance-not-exit boundary. In this section, we extend the
methodology developed above to the case when x is an entrance-not-exit boundary
and x is a natural boundary for X. This setting includes, for example, certain CIR
and Bessel processes (see, for instance, [23]). For the fundamental solutions φr
and ψr , we have that (3.1), (3.2), (2.9) continue to hold if we replace (see [8],
Section 2, paragraph 10)
lim
x↓x ψr(x) = 0 by limx↓x ψr(x) > 0,(3.33)
lim
x↓x
φ′r (x)
S′(x)
= −∞ by lim
x↓x
φ′r (x)
S′(x)
> −∞.(3.34)
This setting is adopted in the remainder of this section. We first examine the
geometric properties associated with the classes A1, A2, as was done previously
in Lemma 3.1, under the new boundary behaviour for x. The asymptotic behaviour
of Hˆ as y ↑ +∞ is exactly the same as in Lemma 3.1 since the upper endpoint
of I is again natural. Notice as well that Hˆ (0+) = 0 by definition of Ai and that
Hˆ ′(0+) always exists by convexity or concavity. Compared to Lemma 3.1, the
difference in the present setting is that functions in A1 and A2 may now have a
finite derivative at zero with either negative or positive sign.
LEMMA 3.9. (i) If H ∈ A1, then Hˆ is convex on (0, yˆh) and concave on
(yˆh,∞). Moreover, Hˆ (0+) = 0, limy→∞ Hˆ (y) = +∞ and H is monotonic in-
creasing on (yˆh,+∞).
In addition if Hˆ ′(0+) < 0, then Hˆ has a unique global minimum in (0, yˆh).
(ii) If H ∈A2, then Hˆ is concave on (0, yˆh) and convex on (yˆh,∞). Moreover,
Hˆ (0+) = 0, limy→∞ Hˆ (y) = −∞ and Hˆ is monotonic decreasing on (yˆh,+∞).
In addition if Hˆ ′(0+) > 0, then Hˆ has a unique global maximum in (0, yˆh).
Notice that by (ii) of Lemma 3.9, Lemma 3.6 continues to hold. We now exam-
ine the effect of the modified geometry on the remaining results.
In the case that Gˆ′1(0+) = −∞, all geometrical considerations are identical to
those of the setting of Section 3.1 and so the proof of the next result is the same as
that of Theorem 3.2.
PROPOSITION 3.10. If Gˆ′1(0+) = −∞, then Theorem 3.2 continues to hold
when x is an entrance-not-exit boundary.
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Next, we analyse cases in which Gˆ′1(0+) ∈ (−∞,0). First, we establish the
existence of equilibria having a degenerate version of the threshold type struc-
ture (1.3), in the sense that we formally take x∗1 = x.
PROPOSITION 3.11. Let Assumption 2.6 hold, let Gˆ′1(0+) < 0 and recall
τ∞2 := τ2(x∞2 ) from Lemma 3.6. Then (+∞, τ∞2 ) is a Nash equilibrium if and
only if
Lˆ1(y
∞
2 )
y∞2
≤ Gˆ′1(0+)(3.35)
with y∞2 = Fr(x∞2 ).
PROOF. Step 1 (Sufficiency). Suppose (3.35) holds and let P2 choose the stop-
ping time τ∞2 which is optimal in problem (3.27), so that P1 is faced with solving
(3.28). Due to condition (3.35), the largest convex function W1 dominated by Gˆ1
on [0, y∞2 ] such that W1(y) = Lˆ1(y), for y ≥ y∞2 , describes the value function (see
details in Appendix A.4). This W1 is given by the straight line starting from the ori-
gin and passing through (y∞2 , Lˆ1(y∞2 )). Therefore, due to strict convexity of Gˆ1 at
zero, P1’s best reply to τ∞2 is the stopping time τ1(x) = inf{t ≥ 0 : Xt = x} = +∞
a.s. (since the entrance-not-exit boundary x is unattainable in finite time). Since
τ∞2 is also P2’s best reply to τ1(x), we have a Nash equilibrium.
Step 2 (Necessity). We show necessity by contradiction. Suppose that (+∞, τ∞2 )
is a Nash equilibrium and that (3.35) does not hold.
Let P2 choose the stopping time τ∞2 so that P1 must solve (3.28). Since (3.35)
does not hold, it is not possible to draw a straight line joining the origin to
(y∞2 , Lˆ1(y∞2 )) and lying below Gˆ1 on (0, y∞2 ). This line would be P1’s payoff
for never stopping, therefore, τ1 = +∞ cannot be a best reply. 
The above proposition shows that the construction of Theorem 3.2 may break
down in some cases, due to the geometry of Gˆ1. Hence, in our present setting
establishing the existence of an equilibrium requires different conditions on the
cost functions, such as those in the next proposition [and indeed there may be
cases where no equilibrium can be found in our class of strategies (1.3)].
PROPOSITION 3.12. Let
−∞ < Gˆ′1(0+) <
Lˆ1(y
∞
2 )
y∞2
< 0(3.36)
and assume limy→∞ Lˆ1(y) > −∞ and yT ≤ yˆ2, where
yT := sup{y > 0 : Gˆ′1(0+)y = Lˆ1(y)} with sup∅= 0,(3.37)
then Theorem 3.2 continues to hold when x is an entrance-not-exit boundary.
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PROOF. Since Gˆ′1(0+)y does not cross Lˆ1(y) for y > yT , it must be that
Lˆ1(y) − Gˆ′1(0+)y is either strictly positive or strictly negative for y > yT . How-
ever, the latter would violate (3.36), since y∞2 > yˆ2 ≥ yT , and hence is impossible.
Then we must have Lˆ1(y) − Gˆ′1(0+)y > 0 for y > yˆ2. Hence, by strict convex-
ity of Gˆ1 in (0, yˆ1) and a simple geometric argument, for ζ > yˆ2 one can always
construct a unique straight line passing through (ζ, Lˆ1(ζ )) and tangent to Gˆ1 at a
point of (0, yˆ1). Thus, L1(·, ζ ) has a unique root y1(ζ ) ∈ (0, yˆ1) for each ζ > yˆ2.
This argument shows that Step 2 of the proof of Theorem 3.2 may be carried
out in the present setting. Step 1 is analogous, and Step 3 follows. 
Under the assumptions of Proposition 3.12, we notice that Corollary 3.3 and
Proposition 3.4 continue to hold, that is, any solution of (3.4) leads to a Nash equi-
librium of threshold type and to the related analytical properties of the equilibrium
payoffs.
REMARK 3.13. 1. It is important to notice that for the existence of an equi-
librium we have not examined whether or not Lˆ2 and Gˆ2 have maxima (see the
proof of Theorem 3.2). Instead, the existence of these maxima and their position
is used in Theorem 3.8 to establish uniqueness of the equilibrium. In the current
setting, Lˆ2 and Gˆ2 have maxima if and only if Lˆ′2(0+) > 0 and Gˆ′2(0+) > 0.
Therefore, assuming the latter along with conditions of Proposition 3.12 we have
that Theorem 3.8 holds.
2. Even though φr(x) ↑ +∞ as x ↓ x, when x is an entrance-not-exit boundary
condition (2.10) may become more restrictive. For instance, for a Bessel process
with index ν = 1/2 (i.e., dimension δ = 3) one has φr(x) ∼ 1/x as x → 0 (see
[8] Appendix 2, pages 638 and 654). In this case, we may relax (2.10) for G1 by
requiring
lim
x↓x
G1
φr
(x) = AG1 ∈ (−∞,+∞).
All the above arguments can then be adapted to establish the existence and unique-
ness results for Nash equilibria. We omit further details here because in the next
section we analyse a similar situation in the case when x is an exit-not-entrance
boundary and (2.10) becomes a serious restriction.
3.3. The case of an exit-not-entrance boundary. Here, we extend the analysis
carried out in the previous two sections by addressing the case of a diffusion with
a lower exit-not-entrance boundary x and an upper natural boundary x. We sketch
most proofs, drawing out key differences with the previous arguments.
Equations (3.1), (3.2) and (2.9) continue to hold if we replace
lim
x↓x φr(x) = +∞ by limx↓x φr(x) < +∞,(3.38)
lim
x↓x
ψ ′r (x)
S′(x)
= 0 by lim
x↓x
ψ ′r (x)
S′(x)
> 0.(3.39)
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This setting is adopted in the remainder of this section.
We see that φr(x+) is now finite so that imposing (2.10) on the stopping costs
requires them to vanish at x (recall that φr is positive). Hence, from now on we
shall relax the definition of the set A by replacing the condition (2.10) with
lim
x↓x
H
φr
(x) = AH(3.40)
for some AH ∈ R depending on H . For any H ∈ A Dynkin’s formula, standard
localisation and (2.8) give
H(x) = AHφr(x)−W−1
[
φr(x)
∫ x
x
ψr(y)h(y)m
′(y) dy
(3.41)
+ψr(x)
∫ x
x
φr(y)h(y)m
′(y) dy
]
and for (H/φr)′(x) we have the same expression as in (2.14).
The geometric implications of the present setting are as follows. Since
limx↓x(φ′r/S′)(x) = −∞ as in the natural boundary case, one can prove as in
Lemma 3.1 that
H ∈A1 ⇒ Hˆ ′(0+) = −∞ and(3.42)
H ∈A2 ⇒ Hˆ ′(0+) = +∞.
Thanks to the latter observation one has that, under the new definition of A,
Lemma 3.1 in the same form with only the exception of the lower boundary con-
ditions: now indeed we have Hˆ (0+) = AH . As one may expect, the sign of AG1
plays a crucial role in determining the existence of Nash equilibria. We study the
two possible cases below, while we always assume AG2 ≥ 0 for simplicity.
PROPOSITION 3.14. If AG1 ≤ 0, then Theorem 3.2 holds when x is an exit-
not-entrance boundary.
PROOF. Condition (3.42) implies that the construction of an equilibrium fol-
lows as in the proof of Theorem 3.2 up to trivial adjustments. 
We now consider AG1 > 0 but with the additional requirement
inf
x∈IG1(x) < 0.(3.43)
In this case, from the above mentioned geometry of Gˆi there exists a unique
straight line passing through the origin and tangent to Gˆ1. We denote the tangency
point by (yS, Gˆ1(yS)) so that yS ∈ (0, yˆ1) is the unique solution of
Gˆ1(yS) = ySGˆ′1(yS).(3.44)
Repeating arguments as in the proof of Proposition 3.11, up to straightforward
modifications, we obtain a similar result.
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PROPOSITION 3.15. Let AG1 > 0 and assume (3.43). Let Assumption 2.6 hold
with (3.40) in place of (2.10). Let also τ∞2 = τ2(x∞2 ) be optimal for (3.27). Then
(σI, τ∞2 ) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if
Gˆ′1(yS) >
Lˆ1(y
∞
2 )
y∞2
(3.45)
with y∞2 = Fr(x∞2 ).
We now introduce
yˆT := sup{y ≥ yS, Gˆ′1(yS)y = Lˆ1(y)} with sup∅= yS,(3.46)
which will play a similar role to yT in the previous section. Before stating the next
result, we recall that since Gˆ2 is concave to the left of xˆ2, an optimal boundary for
P2 will never lie in (x, xˆ2) (see Step 1 in the proof of Theorem 3.2).
PROPOSITION 3.16. Assume that AG1 > 0, that (3.43) holds and
Gˆ′1(yS) ≤
Lˆ1(y
∞
2 )
y∞2
< 0.(3.47)
Assume also that yˆT < yˆ2 and limy→∞ Lˆ1(y) > −∞. Set xS := F−1r (yS) and
σS := inf{t ≥ 0 : Xt ≥ xS} ∧ σI , then with (3.40) in place of (2.10) in Assump-
tion 2.6 one has:
(a) the couple (σS,+∞) is a Nash equilibrium for the game started at x ∈
(x, xS];
(b) the couple (τ ∗1 , τ ∗2 ) of Theorem 3.2 is a Nash equilibrium for the game
started at x > xS .
PROOF. We omit details of the proof which involve the repetition of argu-
ments employed several times above. In terms of the problem geometry, the only
difference in the present case is that for any y0 > yˆ2 the largest convex function
W1 dominated by Gˆ1 and passing through (y0, Lˆ1(y0)) has at most two straight
portions: (i) the usual one connecting Lˆ1(y0) to Gˆ1 via the smooth-fit equation
L1(y1(y0), y0) = 0 and (ii) the straight line rS(y) := Gˆ′1(yS)y for y ∈ [0, yS].
Proposition A.3 shows that W1 provides P1’s minimal expected cost in this set-
ting.
If x ∈ (x, xS], then with probability one P1 stops prior to P2, at time σS , because
Gˆ2 is concave on [0, yS]. Hence, (a) holds, because stopping in finite time can only
increase P2’s expected cost. On the other hand, (b) is obtained as in the proof of
Theorem 3.2. 
In the setting of Proposition 3.16, for each x the additional assumptions of The-
orem 3.8 are again sufficient for the uniqueness of the equilibria we have obtained.
Similarly, they are also sufficient in the case AG1 ≤ 0.
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We also remark that for AG1 ≤ 0, Corollary 3.3 and Proposition 3.4 hold in the
same form whereas for AG1 > 0 they hold in a slightly more complex form. We
provide a full statement for completeness but skip the proof as it is the same as the
original one up to minor adjustments.
PROPOSITION 3.17. Let all the assumptions of Proposition 3.16 hold. Let
(y1, y2) ∈ (0, yˆ1)× (yˆ2,+∞) be a solution of (3.4) and for xi := F−1r (yi), i = 1,2
set
τˆ1 := τ1(x1), τˆ2 := τ2(x2).(3.48)
Then the couple (τˆ1, τˆ2) is a Nash equilibrium for the game started at x ∈ [xS, x)
whereas the couple (σS,+∞) is a Nash equilibrium for the game started at x ∈
(x, xS).
Moreover, the equilibrium payoffs of the two players, that is, vi(x) =
Ji (τˆ1, τˆ2;x), i = 1,2, are given by the functions
(3.49) v1(x) :=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
p1ψr(x) x < x < xS,
G1(x) xS ≤ x ≤ x1,
m1ψr(x)+ q1φr(x) x1 < x < x2,
L1(x) x ≥ x2,
and
(3.50) v2(x) :=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
p2ψr(x) x < x < xS,
L2(x) xS ≤ x ≤ x1,
m2ψr(x)+ q2φr(x) x1 < x < x2,
G2(x), x ≥ x2,
with mi , qi , i = 1,2 as in Proposition 3.4, p1 := G1(xS)/ψr(xS) and p2 :=
L2(xS)/ψr(xS). Also v1 ∈ C(I) with v1 ∈ W 2,∞loc (x, x2) and v2 ∈ C(I) with
v2 ∈ W 2,∞loc (x1, x).
3.4. An alternate sufficient condition. In this section, we consider similar pref-
erences for the two players, in the sense that both stopping cost functions are drawn
from the class A1 (or both drawn from A2). This implies that we must necessarily
drop part (ii) of Assumption 2.6. Throughout the section, we assume again that x
is natural and x is either natural or entrance-not-exit. We will refer below to the
stopping problems
inf
ρ
Ex
[
e−rρGi(Xρ)
]
, i = 1,2.(3.51)
PROPOSITION 3.18. Let (i) and (iii) of Assumption 2.6 hold. Assume now
that G1,G2 ∈A1, with infx∈I Gi(x) < 0. Then, recalling (1.4), there exist x′i ∈ I ,
i = 1,2 such that ρ1,∞i := τ1(x′i ), i = 1,2 are optimal for (3.51).
Moreover, in the game (1.1)–(1.2) we have:
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1. if x′1 > x′2, then the couple (ρ1,∞1 ,+∞) realises a Nash equilibrium;
2. if x′1 < x′2, then the couple (+∞, ρ1,∞2 ) realises a Nash equilibrium;
3. if x′1 = x′2, then both the couples (ρ1,∞1 ,+∞) and (+∞, ρ1,∞2 ) realise Nash
equilibria.
PROOF. For i = 1,2, the existence of x ′i may be easily verified since (3.51) is
an optimal stopping problem of the type studied in [12] [notice that infx∈I Gi(x) <
0, i = 1,2 guarantees that the trivial choice ρ = +∞, Px -a.s. is not optimal
in (3.51)]. The geometric solution method described therein may therefore be ap-
plied, namely the construction of the largest nonpositive convex function domi-
nated by Gˆi . Under the current assumptions, Gˆi has a unique negative minimum
at yi ∈ (0, yˆi) (recall Definition 2.7). It follows that the stopping sets for problems
(3.51) are of the form (x, x′i] with x′i := F−1r (yi) for i = 1,2. Note that a sepa-
rate verification argument is not required in this case, since the sufficiency of this
construction is proved in [12].
Next, we establish the equilibria. We only consider the case x ′1 > x′2 as the other
ones are analogous. Let us start by assuming that P1 stops at ρ1,∞1 and analyse
P2’s best reply. When the game is started at x ≤ x′1, P2 can either stop and incur a
cost G2(x), or continue (i.e., picking any τ2 > 0) and incur a cost L2(x). Hence,
the payoff for P2 is L2(x)1{τ2>0} + G2(x)1{τ2=0}, which is clearly minimised by
choosing τ2 > 0 a.s., since L2 < G2. Hence, J2(ρ1,∞1 , τ2, x) = L2(x) for all x ≤
x′1 and any τ2 > 0, and in particular this is true for τ2 = +∞.
Now for x > x′1, P2 is faced with the optimisation problem
(3.52) u(x) := inf
τ
Ex
[
e−rτG2(Xτ )1{τ≤ρ1,∞1 } + e
−rρ1,∞1 L2(Xρ1,∞1 )1{τ>ρ1,∞1 }
]
.
Noticing that G2/φr has the same monotonicity properties as Gˆ2 (Appendix A.1),
and that the game is terminated by P1 if X hits x′1 it is clear that
Ex
[
e−rτG2(Xτ )1{τ≤ρ1,∞1 }
]
≥ inf
z≥x′1
(
G2
φr
)
(z)Ex
[
e−rτ φr(Xτ )1{τ≤ρ1,∞1 }
]
=
(
G2
φr
)(
x′1
)
Ex
[
e−rτ φr(Xτ )1{τ≤ρ1,∞1 }
]
.
Since also L2 < G2 and (e−rtφr(Xt))t≥0 is a martingale, we obtain the following
lower bound:
u(x) ≥ inf
τ
((
G2
φr
)(
x′1
)
Ex
[
e−rτ φr(Xτ )1{τ≤ρ1,∞1 }
]
+
(
L2
φr
)(
x′1
)
Ex
[
e−rρ
1,∞
1 φr(Xρ1,∞1
)1{τ>ρ1,∞1 }
])
(3.53)
≥ inf
τ
((
L2
φr
)(
x′1
)
Ex
[
e−r(τ∧ρ
1,∞
1 )φr(Xτ∧ρ1,∞1 )
])
=
(
L2
φr
)(
x′1
)
φr(x).
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Taking τ = +∞, P-a.s. in (3.52) [and recalling (2.2)], it now follows from the
Laplace transforms (2.6) that the lower bound above is attained. Hence, it is opti-
mal for P2 to choose τ = +∞ Px -a.s. for all x > x′1.
In conclusion, we have shown that τ = +∞ is a best reply of P2 to P1’s stopping
rule ρ1,∞1 . Since P1’s best reply to τ = +∞ is by definition ρ1,∞1 , we have reached
an equilibrium with (ρ1,∞1 ,+∞) as claimed. 
REMARK 3.19. It is not difficult to check that under (i) and (iii) of Assump-
tion 2.6, letting G1,G2 ∈A2, there exist x′i ∈ I , i = 1,2 such that ρ2,∞i := τ2(x′i ),
i = 1,2 are optimal for (3.51). Moreover, in the game (1.1)–(1.2) we have:
1. if x ′1 > x′2, then the couple (+∞, ρ2,∞2 ) realises a Nash equilibrium;
2. if x′1 < x′2, then the couple (ρ
2,∞
1 ,+∞) realises a Nash equilibrium;
3. if x′1 = x′2, then both the couples (+∞, ρ2,∞2 ) and (ρ2,∞1 ,+∞) realise Nash
equilibria.
APPENDIX
A.1. Convexity of Hˆ . We show here that Hˆ of (2.16) is strictly convex at y >
0 if and only if (LX − r)H(x) > 0 at x = F−1r (y). We simply work out explicitly
calculations indicated by [12], Section 6. For y = Fr(x), it is obvious that Hˆ ′(y) =
g(x) with g(x) := (H/φr)′(x)/F ′r (x) so that Hˆ ′′(y) = g′(x)/F ′r (x). Since Fr is
strictly increasing, we only need to evaluate g′(x). This can be easily done by
observing that
F ′r (x) =
(ψ ′rφr −ψrφ′r )(x)
(φr)2(x)
= W S
′(x)
(φr)2(x)
and g(x) = (H
′φr − Hφ′r )(x)
WS′(x)
from which we get
g′(x) = φr(x)(S
′H ′′ − S′′H ′)(x)
W(S′)2(x)
− H(x)(S
′φ′′r − S′′φ′r )(x)
W(S′)2(x)
.
Now we use that S′′(x) = −2μ(x)S′(x)/σ 2(x) to obtain
g′(x) = 2
Wσ 2(x)(S′)(x)
[
φr(x)LXH(x) −H(x)LXφr(x)]
= 2φr(x)
Wσ 2(x)(S′)(x)
(LXH − rH)(x),
where in the last equality we have used that LXφr = rφr . The last expression
proves the claim and we remark that the result holds even if r = r(x) is state
dependent.
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A.2. Proofs of some lemmas.
PROOF OF LEMMA 3.1. Recalling the notation of Section 2.3, let H ∈ A1.
From Lemma 2.5, we immediately get (i). We notice that indeed Fr(x+) = 0 and
Fr(x−) = +∞ due to (3.1) and the limit at zero of Hˆ is verified from the definition
of A.
If we now show that
(A.1) (a) lim
y↑∞ Hˆ (y) = +∞ and (b) limy↓0 Hˆ
′(y) = −∞,
we can then conclude parts (ii) and (iii).
First, we prove (a) above. By the definition of A1, for fixed δ > 0 there exists
εδ > 0 such that h(z) ≤ −εδ for any z ∈ [xh + δ, x). Moreover, for any x ∈ [xh +
δ, x), (2.13) implies
H(x) = −W−1
[
φr(x)
∫ xh+δ
x
ψr(z)h(z)m
′(z) dz
+ φr(x)
∫ x
xh+δ
ψr(z)h(z)m
′(z) dz
+ψr(x)
∫ x
x
φr(z)h(z)m
′(z) dz
]
(A.2)
≥ −W−1
[
φr(x)Cδ − εδφr(x)
∫ x
xh+δ
ψr(z)m
′(z) dz
− εδψr(x)
∫ x
x
φr(z)m
′(z) dz
]
with Cδ := ∫ xh+δx ψr(z)h(z)m′(z) dz. Using (2.9), we have∫ x
xh+δ
ψr(z)m
′(z) dz = 1
r
[
ψ ′r (x)
S′(x)
− ψ
′
r (xh + δ)
S′(xh + δ)
]
and by using (3.2) also, we obtain∫ x
x
φr(z)m
′(z) dz = −1
r
φ′r (x)
S′(x)
.
Substituting these into (A.2), the right-hand side of (A.2) is equal to
(A.3) −W−1
[
Cδ + εδ
r
ψ ′r (xh + δ)
S′(xh + δ)
]
φr(x)+ εδ
r
,
and so we have
(A.4) H(x)
φr(x)
≥ −W−1
[
Cδ + εδ
r
ψ ′r (xh + δ)
S′(xh + δ)
]
+ εδ
rφr(x)
.
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Using (3.1), we obtain
lim
x↑x
H(x)
φr(x)
= +∞,
and since limy↑∞ F−1r (y) = x, we have established part (a).
To prove (b), let δ > 0, take x < xh − δ, and let y = Fr(x). Note that since
H ∈A1 there exists εδ > 0 such that h(z) ≥ εδ for z ∈ (x, xh − δ] and we obtain
Hˆ ′(y) = − 1
W
[∫ x
xh−δ
φr(z)h(z)m
′(z) dz +
∫ xh−δ
x
φr(z)h(z)m
′(z) dz
]
≤ − 1
W
[∫ x
xh−δ
φr(z)h(z)m
′(z) dz + εδ
∫ xh−δ
x
φr(z)m
′(z) dz
]
(A.5)
= −W−1
[∫ x
xh−δ
φr(z)h(z)m
′(z) dz + εδ
r
(
φ′r (xh − δ)
S′(xh − δ) −
φ′r (x)
S′(x)
)]
,
where the first line follows from (2.14) and the chain rule and the third line by (2.9).
Then, letting y ↓ 0 (equivalently x ↓ x) and using (3.2), we conclude Hˆ ′(0+) =
−∞. The case H ∈A2 follows by symmetric arguments. 
PROOF OF LEMMA 3.6. Problem (3.27) is the same as the one in Ap-
pendix A.4.1 below with xo = x therein. Once we prove existence and uniqueness
of y∞2 then optimality of τ∞2 follows from Proposition A.1.
The equation Gˆ′2(y)y − Gˆ2(y) = 0 with y > yˆ2 expresses the tangency con-
dition for a straight line passing through the origin and tangent to Gˆ2 at a point
in (yˆ2,+∞). If a solution to that equation exists then the convexity of Gˆ2 in
(yˆ2,+∞) implies that it must be unique. For the existence, it is sufficient to ob-
serve that
Gˆ′2(yˆ2)yˆ2 <
∫ yˆ2
0
Gˆ′2(s) ds = Gˆ2(yˆ2)
since Gˆ2 is strictly concave in (0, yˆ2). Recalling (3.12), we get limy→∞[Gˆ′2(y)y−
Gˆ2(y)] = +∞ and, therefore, there exists a unique y∞2 ∈ (yˆ2,+∞). 
A.3. Some remarks on state dependent discounting. Here, we illustrate the
case of a state dependent discount rate (r(Xt))t≥0. In this setting, the payoffs (1.1)
become
J1(τ1, τ2;x) := Ex
[
e−
∫ τ1
0 r(Xt ) dtG1(Xτ1)1{τ1<τ2}
(A.6)
+ e−
∫ τ2
0 r(Xt ) dtL1(Xτ2)1{τ2≤τ1}
]
,
J2(τ1, τ2;x) := Ex
[
e−
∫ τ2
0 r(Xt ) dtG2(Xτ2)1{τ2≤τ1}
(A.7)
+ e−
∫ τ1
0 r(Xt ) dtL2(Xτ1)1{τ1≤τ2}
]
.
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In order to extend the methodology applied above, we make sufficient assumptions
on r to ensure the existence of strictly monotonic and strictly positive fundamental
solutions φr , ψr to the ODE
1
2
σ 2(x)f ′′(x)+μ(x)f ′(x)− r(x)f (x) = 0, x ∈ I.(A.8)
In particular, we assume that r(x) is bounded, continuous and strictly positive for
x ∈ I . In this case, we again have
Ex
[
e−
∫ τ(y)
0 r(Xt ) dt
]
=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
ψr(x)
ψr(y)
x < y,
φr(x)
φr(y)
x > y,
(A.9)
for x, y ∈ I and τ(y) := inf{t ≥ 0 : Xt = y} (see [11], Proposition 2.1). The limits
at the endpoints of the domain I of functions φr , ψr , φ′r/S′ and ψ ′r/S′ remain the
same as in the previous sections, depending on whether x is natural, entrance-not-
exit or exit-not-entrance. Instead of the expressions (2.9), we must now consider
their generalisation (see paragraphs 9 and 10, Chapter 2 of [8]):
ψ ′r (b)
S′(b)
− ψ
′
r (a)
S′(a)
=
∫ b
a
r(y)ψr(y)m
′(y) dy,
(A.10)
φ′r (b)
S′(b)
− φ
′
r (a)
S′(a)
=
∫ b
a
r(y)φr(y)m
′(y) dy,
for x < a < b < x.
It is then easy to see that all the arguments that we have used for the construction
of Nash equilibria in the above sections can be repeated for state dependent dis-
counting and all the results carry over to this setting with no additional difficulties.
In particular, one should notice that positivity and boundedness of r(·) allow us to
find bounds similar to those that led to some of our key inequalities [e.g., (A.3) and
(A.5)]; e.g.„ setting r := supz∈I r(z) the second term in the first equality of (A.5)
can be bounded from below as follows:∫ xh−δ
x
φr(z)m
′(z) dz ≥ 1
r
∫ xh−δ
x
r(z)φr(z)m
′(z) dz = 1
r
(
φ′r (xh − δ)
S′(xh − δ) −
φ′r (x)
S′(x)
)
and the rest of the proof follows in the same way also with state dependent dis-
counting.
We also remark that the argument used to infer convexity and concavity of
the transformed functions Hˆ in Lemma 3.1 and 3.9 holds in the same form, that
is, Hˆ (y) is strictly convex if and only if 12σ
2(x)H ′′(x)+μ(x)H ′(x)−r(x)H(x) >
0 with y = Fr(x).
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A.4. Two useful optimal stopping problems. The proof of Theorem 3.2 in-
volves solving, for each player in turn, an optimal stopping problem whose stop-
ping cost function depends on the strategy of the other player. Our approach to
such problems is inspired by a characterisation via convex analysis due to Dynkin
[16], later developed in [12]. Since it is beyond the scope of the present paper to
develop a complete theory for such problems, however, we adopt the following
hybrid approach. A geometric construction similar to that employed in the latter
references is first used to propose a candidate stopping region and payoff. This
candidate solution is then verified in a second step. In this way, we obtain a con-
venient geometric characterisation of the stopping set and payoff for the particular
optimal stopping problems encountered in Theorem 3.2.
A.4.1. A first optimal stopping problem. Recall Definition 2.4 along with the
notation of (2.15) and (2.16), and consider a function G ∈A2. Denote by xˆ ∈ I the
unique point at which LXG − rG changes its sign and take xo ∈ I with xo < xˆ.
Let us introduce the infinite time horizon optimal stopping problem with value
function
(A.11) Vo(x) := inf
τ∈T Ex
[
e−rτG(Xτ )1{τ≤τo} +L(Xτo)e−rτo1{τo<τ }
]
,
where L(x) < G(x) for all x ∈ I and τo := inf{t ≥ 0 : Xxt ≤ xo}.
First, we notice that if x ≤ xo, picking any τ gives a payoff equal to
L(x)1{τ>0} + G(x)1{τ=0}. The latter is minimised by choosing an arbitrary τ > 0
a.s., and
Vo(x) = L(x) for x ≤ xo.(A.12)
Further, the next standard argument shows that it is never optimal to stop for x < xˆ
since LXG − rG < 0. In fact if x < xˆ, the suboptimal stopping time τˆ := inf{t ≥
0 : Xx ≥ xˆ} gives
Vo(x) ≤ Ex[e−rτˆG(Xτˆ )1{τˆ≤τo} +L(Xτo)e−rτo1{τo<τˆ }]
≤ Ex[e−r(τˆ∧τo)G(Xτˆ∧τo)]< G(x),
where the last inequality is obtained by using Dynkin’s formula and LXG− rG <
0 in (x, xˆ).
It then follows that if an optimal stopping time τ∗ exists then Px(τ∗ = τo) = 0
for all x ∈ I , since xo < xˆ. Hence, in (A.11) we could replace the event {τ ≤ τo}
by the event {τ < τo} with no loss of generality, thus avoiding potential problems
concerning continuity of the value function at xo.
Set yo := Fr(xo) and define the function
(A.13) Q(y) :=
{
Lˆ(y) 0 < y ≤ yo,
Gˆ(y) y > yo.
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For yˆ := Fr(xˆ), we argue as in Section A.1 of this Appendix and obtain that Gˆ is
strictly concave in (0, yˆ) and strictly convex in (yˆ,∞).
Let us consider the straight line ro(·), which passes through the point
(yo,Q(yo)) and is tangent to Q at a point y∗ > yˆ := Fr(xˆ). Existence of ro can be
easily proven due to convexity/concavity of Q (Section A.1) and we leave it to the
reader. This line is expressed as
(A.14) ro(y) = my + q, y > 0,
with
(A.15)
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩m :=
Q(y∗)− Q(yo)
y∗ − yo ,
q := Q(yo)− myo.
By the convexity of Gˆ (and, therefore, of Q) in (yˆ,+∞) the point y∗ is determined
as the unique y > yˆ that solves the tangency equation
Q(y)− Q(yo)
y − yo = Q
′(y).(A.16)
PROPOSITION A.1. Let G ∈ A2. Assume there exists y∗ > yˆ solving (A.16)
(which is then unique). Recall (A.14) and (A.15) and define x∗ := F−1r (y∗) and
the functions
(A.17) W(y) :=
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
Lˆ(y) 0 < y ≤ yo,
my + q yo < y < y∗,
Gˆ(y) y ≥ y∗,
and
(A.18) V˜o(x) := φr(x)W (Fr(x))=
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
L(x) x < x ≤ xo,
mψr(x)+ qφr(x) xo < x < x∗,
G(x) x∗ ≤ x < x.
Then one has V˜o ≡ Vo and τ∗ := inf{t ≥ 0 : Xt ≥ x∗} is optimal for prob-
lem (A.11).
PROOF. If x ≤ xo, there is clearly nothing to prove thanks to (A.12).
Therefore, take x > xo and notice by (A.18) that (LX − r)V˜o(x) = 0 if x ∈
(xo, x∗). Moreover, by Section A.1 we also have that (LX − r)V˜o(x) ≥ 0 if
x ∈ (x∗, x), since y∗ > yˆ and Gˆ is convex in (yˆ,∞). Also, by construction,
V˜o(x∗) = G(x∗), V˜ ′o(x∗) = G′(x∗), V˜o(xo) = L(xo) and V˜o ≤ G, for any x > xo.
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Since V˜o ∈ W 2,∞loc ((x0, x)), we can apply Itô–Tanaka’s formula to the process
(e−rt V˜o(Xxt ))t≥0 on the time interval [0, τ ∧ τo], for arbitrary τ ∈ T , and obtain
V˜o(x) ≤ Ex[e−rτ∧τo V˜o(Xτ∧τo)](A.19)
≤ Ex[e−rτG(Xτ )1{τ≤τo} +L(Xτo)e−rτo1{τ>τo}]
and hence V˜o ≤ Vo. Then repeating the argument with τ = τ∗ we find
V˜o(x) = Ex[e−rτ∗G(Xτ∗)1{τ∗≤τo} + L(Xτo)e−rτo1{τ∗>τo}]
and, therefore, V˜o = Vo and τ∗ is optimal. 
Notice that, when restricted to [yo,+∞), the function W is the largest convex
function dominated by Q. The latter condition makes the result slightly different to
the geometric characterisation in [12] (they have Gˆ = Lˆ and then W is nonpositive;
see also [30]).
A.4.2. A second optimal stopping problem. For the next optimal stopping
problem, we take the same setup as in Section A.4.1, with the modifications that
G ∈A1, xo > xˆ and τo := inf{t ≥ 0 : Xxt ≥ xo}. Again we recall that if an optimal
stopping time τ∗ exists then Px(τ∗ = τo) = 0 for all x ∈ I so that the indicator
functions in (A.11) may effectively be taken with strict inequalities only. As be-
fore, we denote
(A.20) Q(y) :=
{
Gˆ(y) 0 < y < yo,
Lˆ(y) y ≥ yo.
In contrast to the situation in Section A.4.1, in the present setting we will consider
two possible geometries for this optimal stopping problem, in Propositions A.2
and A.3, respectively. This is necessary because it may in principle be optimal to
stop anywhere in the interval (x, xˆ) and the geometry of Gˆ on (0, yˆ) depends on
the boundary behaviour of X at x, which we vary through the paper.
In what follows, we write
m¯ := Q(yo)/yo(A.21)
and recall that for a not nonsingular lower boundary x we have ψr(x)/φr(x) → 0
as x → x.
PROPOSITION A.2. Let G ∈A1. If
Q(y) > m¯y for all y ∈ (0, yo)(A.22)
then the function
(A.23) V˜o(x) :=
{
m¯ψr(x) x < x < xo,
L(x) xo ≤ x < x,
is such that V˜o ≡ Vo, and further the stopping time τ∗ := +∞ is optimal for prob-
lem (A.11).
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PROOF. Clearly, V˜o ∈ C2b(x, xo) and LxV˜o − rV˜o = 0 on (x, xo). By the same
geometric arguments as in the proof of Proposition A.1, and using (A.22), we also
have V˜o(x) ≤ G(x). Hence, by applying Itô’s formula for x ∈ (x, xo) and any τ
we get (A.19) and, therefore, V˜o(x) ≤ Vo(x).
For fixed ε > 0, picking τ = τε := inf{t ≥ 0 : Xt ≤ x + ε} we also find
V˜o(x) = Ex[e−r(τε∧τo)V˜o(Xτε∧τo)]
= Ex[e−rτε V˜o(Xτε)1{τε≤τo} + e−rτoL(Xτo)1{τo<τε}]
= m¯ψr(x + ε)
φr(x + ε) λo(x)+ Ex
[
e−rτoL(Xτo)1{τo<τε}
]
,
with
λo(x) := ψr(x)φr(xo)−ψr(xo)φr(x)
(ψr/φr)(x + ε)φr(xo)−ψr(xo)
by (A.23) and equation (4.3) in [12]. Letting ε → 0 we have τε → σI and ψr(x +
ε)/φr(x+ε) → 0. Thus, taking limits and using dominated convergence and (2.2),
we obtain
V˜o(x) = Ex[e−rτoL(Xτo)1{τo<∞}]≥ Vo(x),
hence completing the proof. 
Because of the convexity of Gˆ on (0, yˆ), if
Gˆ(0+) > 0 and inf
y∈(0,yo)
[
Gˆ(y)− m¯y]≤ 0(A.24)
then there exist two points 0 < y∗,1 ≤ y∗,2 < yˆ such that the straight line r1(y) :=
m¯1y, with m¯1 := Q(y∗,1)/y∗,1, is tangent to Q(y∗,1) while y∗,2 solves (A.16).
In this case, we have the following proposition, whose proof we omit due to its
similarity to Proposition A.1.
PROPOSITION A.3. Let G ∈ A1 be such that (A.24) is satisfied and let y∗,1
and y∗,2 be the points described above. Then writing x∗,i := F−1r (y∗,i ) for i = 1,2
and defining m,q as in (A.15), the function
(A.25) V˜o(x) :=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
m¯1ψ(x) x < x < x∗,1,
G(x) x∗,1 ≤ x ≤ x∗,2,
mψr(x)+ qφr(x) x∗,2 < x < xo,
L(x) xo ≤ x < x,
is such that V˜o ≡ Vo. Further the stopping time τ∗ := inf{s ≥ 0 : Xs ∈ [x∗,1, x∗,2]}
is optimal for problem (A.11).
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It is immediate to check that, when restricted to the domain (0, yo], the func-
tion W(y) := (Vo/φr) ◦ F−1r (y) is the largest convex function dominated by Q.
If Gˆ(0+) ≤ 0, then y∗,1 clearly does not exist in (0, yo) and instead we state the
following corollary, whose proof is left to the reader.
COROLLARY A.4. Let G ∈ A1 with Gˆ(0+) ≤ 0 and assume y∗,2 exists as
described above. Then the results of Proposition A.3 hold with x∗,1 = x.
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